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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF TiiE

STATE OF UTAH

MER\VYN L. WILKINSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH; GARRETT FREIGHTLINES, INC., and TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

Case No.
11814

Defendants, and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff has appealed from the Order of
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying the
Plaintiff's application for benefits under the \Vorkmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah. The
Order of the Commission found that the applicant
was not in the course of his employment at the time
of the accident complained of by the Plaintiff and
therefore was not entitled to recover compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State
of Utah.
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DISPOSITION BY THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
The Industrial Commission held that the applicant was not acting in the course of his employment
at the time the accident occurred and therefore his
application was denied.
RELIEF SOUGHT BY DEFENDANTS
Defendants submit that the decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff was injured as he was driving
his motorcycle on Redwood Road in Salt Lake City,
Salt Lake County, after leaving the premises of his
employer, the Defendant Garrett Freightlines, Inc.,
whose place of business is located on the west side
of Redwood Road at about 50 South. The accident
occurred on September 7, 1967, at about 4 :15 p.m.
The Plaintiff was struck by an automobile which
was southbound on Redwood Road (R. 167-169).
The Plaintiff was attempting to make a left turn to
go north on Redwood Road. Redwood Road, otherwise known as 16th West, runs north and south in
Salt Lake City.
The Plaintiff was employed by Garrett Freightlines, Inc. as a driver on the "extra board." A driver
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\\·ho is on the extra board, when he comes in from
run. places his name at the bottom of the extra
1oarcl list and he is called for work when needed.
BPing on the extra board, he had no regular nm but
went any place in the area serYiced by the Defend;111t Garrett Freightlines, Inc. when called up for
\\·m·k by his employer. The extra board driYers are
called up in rotation.
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. had an agreement
with the Teamsters Local Union that required Garrett's to give its drivers on the extra board an alert
call between the hours of 5 :00 p.m. and 7 :00 p.m.,
following which a firm call to report for work was
giYen two hours prior to departure time (R. 172).
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. neither requested nor encouraged the Plaintiff to personally call at their
dispatch office on the day of the accident or at any
other time (R. 111-112).
On the day of the accident the Plaintiff called
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. and talked with Jack
Christensen, the terminal manager, and told Mr.
Christensen that he would call in at 5 :30 p.m. (R.
109 and R. 46-48). This was done to protect his
position on the f'xtra board.
The Plaintiff was not being paid at the time
the accident occurred and his pay would not have
commenced until some six hours later when he should
have reported for duty.

4

ARGUlVIENT
I
PLAINTIFF WAS
INJURED IN THE
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
A. THE
\VAS ON HIS OWN AT
THE TLME HE \VAS INJURED.

The e\·idencc is clear that the Plaintiff at the
time he met with his accident was on his way home.
He was not coming to or going from work at the
time. The occasion of his being where the accident
occu1Ted was of his own Yolition and did not in any
way further or aid his employer's work. Garrett
Freightlines, Inc. ga\·e no directions or instructions
to the Plaintiff to report to their place of business
or to do \vhat he did, but on the contrary had made
specific arrangements with the union as to how and
when the dri\·ers, including the Plaintiff herein,
were to be notified as to \vhether they would be
used and when to report to work.
Jack Stanley Christensen, terminal manager
for c;aiTPt t Freightlines, Inc., testified as follows:
was Mr. \Yilkinson requested by
anyone in you1· company, to report in
person eal'lic1· that day?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you require your employees to report in person?
A. No, sir.
"Q.

y1m.

01·
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Q.
is the procedure, quickly, as to
tlw calling of men who an· on the extra board?
A. \Yell, beginning at anv particular
point?
Q. Yes. Just so that the record is clear as
to how this works.
THE REFEREE: \Yell, let's put it this
way, to save time: Is there anv substantial
variation in the way Mr. \Yilkinson and the
previous witness Mr. Stoddard, have testified
i·egarding the operation of the extra board?
Is that in substance the way it operates?
THE \VITNESS: \Yell, I could only add
one thing, Mr. Examiner. There was quite an
emphasis made on the fact that they were
required to be on call all the time. And this
is the very purpose of the rules that we have,
so that they aren't required to be on call all
the time. But, in substance, they're correct.
THE REFEREE: I see." (IL 111-112).
B. THE PLAINTIFF HAD KO VALID
TO
GO TO GARRETT'S AT 4:00 P.M. ON THE DAY OF
THE ACCIDENT.

The plaintiff was rmployecl as an extra board
driver. He could, after signing in on the extra board
upon completing his last run. ascertain how many
drivers \\·ere ahead of him and \Yhen he might again
be used by his employer. He would hm·e been on
alert after receiving a call from the dispatcher, and
being advised that he would be used.
The usual time for extra board drivers to leave
the employer's place of business on a "run" is late
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in the evening. \Vilkinson was not requi1·ed to report in person to his employer to make himself available for work. The nonnal procedure was for the
dispatcher to call the dri,·ern on the telephone. The
union contract required the dispatcher to place an
alert call between the hours of five and seven in
the evening, or if the employee knows that he will
not be available during those hours then it is to
the advantage of the employee to call and give the
dispatcher information as to whether he will be available and where he would be at a certain hour. In
this respect see the testimony of Milton R. Stoddard,
a driver employee of Garrett Freightlines, Inc.
called by the Plaintiff ( R. 26).
"Q. Would you please describe for the
record what the extra board is?
A. "\Vell, it's a rotating board that takes
care of anyone that's on vacation or cancels
out. They're called to pull extra runs, extra
divisions, or extra sleepers.
Q. Are the men called according to the
business needs of Garrett Freightlines?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. \Vhen a driver on extra board finishes
a run, what does he usually do with respect to
the board?
A. You just sign the bottom of the board,
and as it rotates to the top he's called.
Q. During what hours of the day can an
extra board driver be called?
A. Anytime.
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. Q. He can be called anytime, anytime during the 24-hour period.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How much notice is he giYen?
A. Two hours.
Q. Now, if you're subject 1:-0 a 24-hour
call, as an extra board driver, how does a
driver know approximately when he will have
to drive again?
A. Well, after you've been on the board a
little while, you can tell fairly close. Like you
get up at seven or eight in the morning, and
you want to know whether you got the day
off, you usually call in, and the dispatcher
will tell you approximately what time 1:-0 call
back or check with him. Or he'll tell you that
you're far enough down the board, they won't
need you, and not to bother with them and
they'll call you during the regular dispatch
hours, five to seven at night. And, therefore,
you have a day off, in other words." (R. 2627).
Mr. Christensen, the manager of Garrett
Freightlines, testified as to the procedure followed
as a result of an agreement with the union in respect
to calling men on the extra board for work.
"Q. And then the dispatcher has the responsibility of making the telephone calls 1:-0
alert these people; is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. After they have made an alert
what then does the dispatcher do. Presummg
that he made an alert call for this 10 :00 o'clock
trip, what other calls would he make?
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A. \Vell, he would call at 8 :00 o'clock and
give
the ch·iver a firm call to report at 10 .·oo
, 1 l
0 C10C \.

Q. So there are t\vo l'.alls; is that right?
A. There could be two calls.
Q. And one is called an alert call, and
that's between six and eight, I mean - yes
bet\veen six and eight; is that right?
'
A. \V ell, the call between four and six Q. I see.
A. - is an alert call.
Q. That's to do what.
A. That notifies or alerts all drivers that
are going to be used between that time and
7 :00 o'clock the following morning.
Q. That merely tells them that they're going to be called sometime that evening; is that
right?
A. Uh huh.
Q. And then the next call is made when?
A. Two hours prim· to the departure time.
1\ow, rm speaking of the time between 7 :00
at night, or 6 :00 o'clock at night and
7 :0() o'clock in the morning.
Q. Then they're given the two hours' notification, and time to get ready to come; is
that rigi1t?
A. Right.
l\IR. \\.ELCH: Does that clear that up,
11r. Shaughnessy?
THE REFEREE: Just one question in
this area: \Voulcl .Ml'. \Vilkinson have received
a call between fou1· and six?
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THE \\'IT NESS: He would haYe. You
mean had he not THE REFEREE: Had he not been injured?
THE \VITNESS: Yes, uh huh.
THE REFEREE: And this would have
advised him that sometime after 7 :00 o'clock
p.m. he would receive an alert call; or that
is, a call for work.
'
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir, uh huh.
THE REFEREE: And then he normally
would have been called at 8 :00 o'clock, then,
to report for work by ten.
THE WITNESS: This is correct." ( R.
116-118).
See also the agreement with the union (R. 172).
Milton R. Stoddard, called on behalf of the Plaintiff, testified as follows regarding the procedure
followed by drivers on the "extra board."
"Q. Now, there is no requirement that you
men on the extra board, or men on the extra
board, come in personally to report to the Garrett Freightlines depot there, is there?
A. No, sir.
Q. No requirement, at all.
A. (Witness shakes head in the negative.)
Q. Now, the normal procedure is through
the telephone call; is that right?
A. That's what everybody usually uses,
yes.
Q. And isn't it normal procedure also for
those on the extra board to, if they're not
going to be available by the telephone two
hours before they're about to go out, or be-
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tween the hours of - what is it four to six
when they make their call?
'
When do they make their call the dispatchers make their call?
'
A. They call your sleepers between four
and six, and the extra board between five and
seven.
Q. All right.
Now, if you are on the extra board, then
and if you are not going to be available
your home or residence, or wherever, between
five and seven, what is your general practice?
A. Usually to call them.
Q. Call them on the phone and let them
know when you'll call in'!
A. Yes.
Q. And you leave the message that you'll
call in, or you'll be at a certain place at a certain hour; is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. And if you call in and leave that message, and is that written on this extra board
sheet?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. And then that message gets to whom?
A. Just a second. I'll take that back. It
is. Usually if you call the regular dispatcher,
and leave a number, it's written on there, to
where they can get ahold of you.
Q. Where they can get in touch with you
on what you are going to do.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Whether you're going to call in or
whether they're going to call you; is that
right?
· . Y '>. sir.

at
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Q. And so then if that is done, then there'd
be no reason for anyone to come in, because
that call would be made at that point· is that
right?
'
A. Yes, sir, that's right." (R. 46-48).
The Plaintiff made a telephone call to the terminal manager, Mr. Christensen, earlier in the day of
the accident and in substance ad,·ised that he would
not be available until "1730" when he would again
call. His testimony as to the call and as to not being
required to report in person was as follows:
"Q. And did you tell them that you would
call back at 1730?
A. I well could have.
Q. And what does "1730" mean?
A. 5 :30 in the evening.
Q. 5 :30 in the evening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Now, then you did notify them that
you would call at that time; is that right?
A. That or before. At least no later than
that, yes.
Q. Now, you were not asked to come in
personally, were you?
A. Never asked to come in personally, no.
Q. Or you were never told to come in personally, were you?
A. Only to pull my trips.
Q. All right.
.
But I mean you were not told to come m
personally, and report in A. No.
..
h
Q. - or to check out your pos1t10n on t e
extra board.
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A. No. I was never told to report, and I
was never told I couldn't. So I did both.
Q And on that day, the same thing is true
on that particular day.
A. Yes.
(R. 87-88).
The Referee questioned the Plaintiff relative
to the telephone call he made and he asked in conclusion the following question and received the following answer:
"THE REFBREE: Then it's fair to assume that somebody wrote that on there pursuant to your telephone call that you would
check back at 1730?
THE WITNESS: I would say that's what
it's from, yes."
(R.96-97).
The record is clear that the Plaintiff did call
in and had protected his place on the extra boara;
nevertheless, on his own volition, he entered Garrett's at 4 :00 p.m.
Mr. Larry Donald Hollis, dispatcher, who was
on duty at the time the accident occurred, testified
on direct and cross-examination that at 4 :00 or 4 :15
p.m., which was just after he reported for duty, that
he would not know for sure whether Mr. Wilkinson
would be called because he first had to call out all
.;leeper drivers between the hours of 4 :00 p.m. and
6 :00 p.m. and that he would not know how many
extra board men the company was going to use until
all the sleeper drivers had been called. The sleeper
drivers are men on bid trucks. After that the extra
board men are called (R. 131-132).
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The substance of Mr. Hollis' testimony is that
at 4 :00 p.m. when Wilkinson came into his dispatch
office all he could have told him \Vas that he would
probably be used that evening. The dispatcher did
not know at the time Mr. Wilkinson went to the
dispatcher's office for certain when or how Mr. \Vilkinson would be used. It was too early for the dispatcher to determine these facts. Therefore, no useful purpose was served by Wilkinson making a personal call at the dispatcher's office at the time he
made the call. This is especially in Yiew of the fact
that he had earlier called Mr. Jack Christensen and
had indicated to him that he would call in at 5 :30
p.m. because by that time the dispatcher would have
known whether for certain Mr. Wilkinson would
be used and where he would be going.
The record is clear that Mr. Wilkinson went to
Garrett's on his own volition. No advantage was
gained thereby either to himself or to his employer.
Nothing was gained or could have been gained by
the Plaintiff's appearance at his employer's place
of business.
C. NEITHER THE PLAINTIFF NOR THE DEFENDANT BENEFITTED FROM THE VISIT
MADE BY THE PLAINTIFF.

Garrett's business was not aided by \Vilkinson
driving his motorcycle into his employer's place of
business at 4 :00 in the afternoon. At that time the
dispatcher would not know what drivers might be
needed.
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In this connection Jack Stanley Christensen, on
cross-examination, was asked the following questions:

"Q. Could it have been possible that a dispatcher would have considered Mr. Wilkinson's visit the equal of an alert call?
A. No.
Q. Why it that?
A. Because he wouldn't know at 4: 15 or
4 :30 what the man was going to do or what
even the dispatcher was going to do. (R. 12212:1).
Further questioning of Mr. Christensen by
Plaintiff's attorney revealed that no drivers had
gone out by 4 :00 o'clock, that Keith Beale left at
7 :00 o'clock in the evening; that Mr. Thiel left at
9 :00 o'clock and the next one left at 10 :00 o'clock
(R. 124).
At that time in the afternoon Wilkinson was
not benefitted as he could not have found out when
he was going to go out, but he could only possibly
have been advised by the dispatcher that he would
go out that evening. However, this problem had
already been met. The Plaintiff had called in earlier
and had talked with Mr. Christensen on the telephone advising that he would be available and that
he would call in at 1730 or 5 :30 in the afternoon.
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On direct examination Mr. Christensen testified as follows:
"Q. (By Mr. Welch) Now, Mr. Christensen, in whose handwriting is that notation?
A. That is mine.
Q. And what was the occasion for you
making that notation on that sheet?
A. Well, Mr. Wilkinson called in and said
that he would be available for work, and would
not be available for work until 1730.
Q. And was anything else said in that conversation?
A. I don't remember the conversation.
Q. And you made that notation at that
time?
MR. THOMPSON: Objection.
A. Yes, I did.
THE REFEREE : I think he can answer.
This is a conversation you had with Mr.
Wilkinson, I take it. Is that correct, Mr.
Christensen?
A. Yes, sir."
(R. 110).
The Plaintiff testified that it was the responsibility of his employer through the dispatcher to call
and give him an alert call between the hours of five
and seven in the evening.

"Mr. Welch: I am asking Mr. Wilkinson
whether it is not true that the employer,
through their dispatcher, is not required to
give them a two-hour alert call between the
hours of five and seven.
Q. Is that right?
.
.
A. Only if you are going out that evenmg.
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Q. That's right.
A. If they think Q. If you are going out that evening.
A. If they think they want you. They still
don't know, you understand.
Q. And they're the ones that should make
the call to you; is that right?
A. That's correct.
Q. And then if they know where you are,
you have no responsibility for calling in to
them, have you?
A. If they know where you are?
Q. Yes. So they can get in touch with you.
A. That's right.
Mr. Welch: That's all."
(R. 101-102).
The employer's business was not aided or enhanced by the Plaintiff going to Garrett's place of
business at about 4 :00 o'clock in the afternoon.
Neither was it necessary or helpful for Mr. Wilkinson, as he had previously telephoned and advised
that he would call in at about 5 :30 p.m. Garrett's,
therefore, knew that the Plaintiff would be available
for work that evening.
POINT II.
GOING TO AND COMING FROM WORK IS
NOT COVERED BY THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

Defendants take the position that in this case
the Plaintiff was neither going to work nor coming
from work; however, the general rule in this state
is that under normal circumstances coming to and
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going from work are not within the course of employment in the absence of a special mission.
The rule was stated in Vitagraph, Inc., 'VS. Iridustrial Commission, 85 P. 2d 601, 96 Utah 190, at
603 P. 2d., the Court said:
"It seems definitely settled that if a workman is injured in the normal course of things
in going to or from his work or place of
ployment, that is the result of the general
hazards which all must meet and assume and
is not in the course of his employment. Deriver & Rio Grande Western R. Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512, 62
A.L.R. 1436; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Iridustrial Cmnmission, 79 Utah 189, 8 P. 2d.
617; Greer v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah
379, 279 P. 900. Such is what may be called
the plant rule, where the employee does not
attach himself to his employment until he
arrives at the plant or locus of his work, and
he is not in the employment after he leaves
the plant or situs of his work."
It is claimed by the Plaintiff that the circumstances under which he was injured were unusual
and that he was subject to greater danger than was
the general public. This we cannot agree to, because
Redwood Road where the accident occurred is a
street regularly traveled by the citizens of Salt Lake
City. The dangers that he encountered as he entered
Redwood Road on his motorbike were no more than
the dangers encountered by any person using the
said street. There was nothing to hinder the Plain-
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tiff's vision as he left the Garrett Freightlines yard,
and the hazard which was his as he left the yard was
common to all persons using Redwood Read. There
was nothing in the risk which he took that was peculiar to the Plaintff's employment and was not common to all persons using Redwood Road.
In the case of Greer vs. State Industrial Commission of Utah, 74 Utah 379, 279 P. 900, a carpenter foreman was injured shortly bef01·e 8 :00 a.m. as
he was on his way to work. This Court said at 279
P. 901:
"In this case the deceased was not injured
while sharpening the saw at his home. The
accident did not occur while he was actually
engaged in the performance of a duty for the
employer. The dangers of the street between
his home and the stockyards were not incident
to his employment, but were dangers common
to all." (Emphasis ours.)
Redwood Road is not inherently dangerous. Mr.
Stoddard, the Plaintiff's witness, testified that he
had parked in Garrett's parking lot for years; that
there were three entrances to Garrett's place of business wide enough to accommodate two vehicles; that
he had never had any problem getting in or out; and
that the only person he had known who had had
trouble was Mr. Wilkinson.
Mr. Stoddard was asked the following questions:
"Q. Now, Garrett's is on the west side of
the street, is that right?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. West side of Redwood Road.
Aren't there, in fact, three entrances in
and out of Garrett Freightlines' place of business there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And these are gateways through the
fence.
A. There is no fence against the street.
Q. No fence?
A. No.
Q. I see.
They're actually entranceways, then, into
Garrett's?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And each one of these entranceways
are wide enough to accommodate two vehicles?
A. Yes. The middle one is a wide, used
for your trucks. And the two end ones are the one on the south end is usually just used
by the men coming to work, and parking in
the south part. But the main entrance is where
most of the people turn in there.
Q. And when you go in, as well as the
other employees go in, you drive cars in there,
do you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you park inside the Garrett
lot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you've done this for years?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You've never had any problem coming
in or out?
A. No, sir.
Q. Have you known of anybody that ever
has had any problem coming in and out?
A. Just one.
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Q. And this is 1.Vlr. vVilkinson?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Other than that, the employees have
been able to drive in or out whether they make
a left-hand turn 01· right-hand turn· is that
right?
'
(R. 50-51).
A. Yes, sir."
The evidence is clear that there was no special
problem or special dange1· involved in connection with
one entering 01· leaving Garrett's place of business.
Redwood Road is a road which presents no special
problems to one entering the premises of Garrett
Freightlines, Inc. or to the motoring public.
The Plaintiff relies on two Utah cases, Cudahy
Packing Cmnpany vs. Industrial Cmmnission, 60
Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922), aff'd, Cudahy Packing
Company vs. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153
( 1923) and the case of Bountiful Brick Cmnpany
vs. Industrial Comniission, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555
( 1926), aff'd, Bountiful Brick Cmnpany vs. Giles,
276 U.S. 154, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928). These cases,
however, can be distinguished from the case before
the Court.
In the Parramore case, the employee was struck
100 feet from his employer's plant as he crossed a
railroad track. He was on a county road which was
the only means of access to the plant and which was
kept under repair for persons traveling to and from
the employer's plant. This is an entirely different
factual situation from the present case in that the
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employee was on his way to work when the accident
occu1Ted and the county road was maintained for
the benefit of Parramore's employer. The Plaintiff
herein came to the employer's premises voluntarily
and on his own initiative approximately four hours
before he would normally be called to work.
In the Bountiful Brick case the injured employee
likewise was on his way to work, which is not true in
the instant case, and likewise the injury occurred
while the employee was crossing the railroad track
adjacent to the employer's place of business.
Plantiff's brief contains numerous references
to cases from various parts of the United States
which have held the employer liable for injury to
employees when they were at or near the employer's
place of business. However, a careful reading of all
of these cases reveals that they involve employees
going to or coming from work, which is not true in
the instant case, and that the accidents most generally occurred upon or within property controlled or
owned by the injured man's employer. None of these
circumstances apply to the case before this Court.
There is good reason for the rule that injuries
received while coming to and going from work are
not covered. Otherwise there would be no line of
demarcation. If an employee should be covered for
an accident occurring on a public street while he is
either going to or coming from work it would be
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just as logical to conclude that he should be covered
for an injury received just as he left his home.
Our discussion of the law relative to coming to
and going from work should not be construed to be
our belief that the case before the Court falls in that
category. We take the position that the Plaintiff
was neither coming to nor going from work, that
what he did was entirely voluntary on his part, not
necessary or required because of his employment.
POINT III.
THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION BASED UPON SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE OVERRULED.

It has been said by the Supreme Court in numerous decisions that pursuant to Section 35-1-84,
U.C.A., 1953, that only if the Industrial Commission
arbitrarily disregards competent, uncontradicted
evidence will the decision of the Commission be reversed.
In Kent vs. Industrial C01nmission, 89 U. 381,
57 P. 2d. 724 at 385 U. the Court said:
"In the case of denial of compensation, the
record must disclose that there is material,
substantial, competent, uncontradicted evidence sufficient to make a disregard of it justify the conclusion, as a matter of law that
the Industrial Commission arbitrarily and
capriciously disregarded the evidence or unreasonably refused to believe such evidence."

23

The Supreme Court held in Sutton, ewl. vs.
Industrial Commission, 9 U. 2d. 339, 344 P. 2d 538,
that there was no basis on which the Commission's
action could be regarded as capricious, arbitrary or
unreasonable when there was substantial, credible
evidence to sustain the findings of the Commission.
In Burton 'VS. Indiistrial Commission, 13 U. 2d.
353, 37 4 P. 2d. 439, this Court said at 354 U.:
"In order to reverse the finding and order
made Plaintiff must show that there is such
credible uncontradicted evidence in her favor
that the Commission's refusal to so find was
capricious and arbitrary."
In the matter before this Court the Commission
had substantial, uncontradicted testimony on which
to make and enter its finding that the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff Merwyn L. \Vilkinson did
not arise out of or in the course of his employment
with Garrett Freightlines, Inc. The facts are undisputed. The Plaintiff was not on an errand for his
employer. He was neither going to or leaving work.
He had no good reason to go to Garrett's on the
afternoon the accident occurred.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion Defendants submit that the decision of the Industrial Commission should be affirmed
for the following reasons:
1. That the accident sustained by the Plaintiff
did not arise out of or in the course of his employment with the Defendant Garrett Freightlines, Inc.
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2. That the Plaintiff at the time the accident
occurred was not performing any duty that was
beneficial to his employer or to himself inasmuch as
his employer had already been contacted by the Plaintiff and was aware of the fact that he was available
for work and that the Plaintiff would make a telephone call at 5 :30 p.m.
3. That the law is clear that one going to or
corning from work is not covered under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State of Utah unless
he is on a special mission for his employer at the
time. The Plaintiff was not on a special mission
for his employer at the time the accident occurred,
but on his own volition went to his employer's place
of business four hours prior to the time that he
\vould have been called to report for work.
4. That there was substantial and competent
evidence to support the findings of the Industrial
Commission.
Respect£ ully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
326 State Capitol Building
CHARLES WELCH, JR.
922 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants

